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Although healthy aging has been related to a decline in recollection as indexed by objective 
measures, the subjective experience of recollection sometimes remains stable. To date, however, 
these age-related differences have only been examined using aggregated data across trials. In 
the current study, we investigated the relationship between subjective and objective measures 
of recollection on a trial-by-trial basis to determine whether the magnitude of this relationship 
was similar in young and older adults. Young and older participants were presented with pictures 
that were associated with descriptive labels at encoding. At retrieval, they were cued with the 
labels and were asked to rate the vividness of their memory for the associated picture and to 
recall as many details of the picture as possible. On average, older adults assigned higher 
vividness ratings but recalled fewer episodic details than young adults. Mixed-effects modeling 
revealed that the relationship between subjective (vividness) and objective (number of recalled 
details) recollection across trials was stronger in young than in older participants. These findings 
provide evidence that older adults not only retrieve fewer episodic details but also rely on these 
details to a lesser extent than young adults for judging the subjective quality of their memories.   
Keywords: episodic memory; aging; recollection; vividness; subjective remembering 





Deciphering the Relationship between Objective and Subjective Aspects of Recollection in 
Healthy Aging 
 
Recollection designates the capacity to retrieve and reinstate contextual details of a 
past episode (Yonelinas, 2002). A first way to operationalize recollection is to collect 
introspective reports on the phenomenological experience accompanying episodic 
reminiscence. This subjective dimension of recollection is often measured using “Remember” 
judgements in recognition paradigms or vividness ratings in recall tasks (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993; Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998; Yonelinas, 2002). A second way 
to measure recollection is by assessing the objective accuracy of contextual information or 
specific details reported during memory retrieval. In this case, source memory—which requires 
participants to retrieve the encoding context associated with an item—or free-recall tasks are 
commonly used (Duarte, Henson, & Graham, 2008; Duarte, Ranganath, Trujillo, & Knight, 2006; 
Mitchell & Johnson, 2009). Objective and subjective aspects of recollection are often measured 
separately in episodic memory tasks, so that little is known about their relationship. 
Understanding to what extent subjective judgements map onto reactivated details is important, 
particularly because introspective reports are deemed to reflect the richness of recollection.  
When remembering the past, the objectively reactivated memory details are weighted 
by monitoring processes to give rise to a subjective sense of recollection (Bastin et al., 2019). 
Aging is associated with an impairment in both the retrieval of episodic details and in how these 
details are monitored (Wong et al., 2012), while, somewhat surprisingly, the subjective 
experience of vividness seems preserved (Mitchell & Hill, 2019). Therefore, examining age-
4 
 
related changes in the relationship between reactivated memory contents and subjective 
vividness is warranted. In the current study, we aimed to investigate age-related differences in 
the relationship between subjective vividness and the objective recall of details during episodic 
recollection.  
 
Age-related changes in objective and subjective recollection 
It is widely accepted that recollection is particularly age-sensitive (Koen & Yonelinas, 
2014). Studies that evaluated objective and subjective recollection within a single task 
documented a discrepancy between subjective memory experience and the objective retrieval 
of episodic details in older individuals. For instance, young and older adults displayed similar 
rates of subjective Remember judgements in spite of older adults performing significantly 
worse on objective source memory measures (Mark & Rugg, 1998; Duarte et al. 2006; 2008). 
Other evidence pointed out that older adults subjectively rated their autobiographical memory 
as being as detailed as young adults did, despite their poorer source memory accuracy (Gallo, 
Korthauer, McDonough, Teshale & Johnson, 2011; McDonough & Gallo, 2013). Furthermore, 
older adults were found to report similar or even higher subjective ratings than young adults for 
the amount of details and the vividness of past events (De Brigard et al., 2016; Comblain, 
D’Argembeau, & Van Der Linden, 2005), even when they retrieved quantitatively fewer episodic 
details (Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1990; Robin & Moscovitch, 2017).  
McDonough and colleagues proposed two hypotheses to explain the dissociation 
between subjective and objective measures of recollection in older adults (McDonough, 
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Cervantes, Gray, & Gallo, 2014). The recollection quantity hypothesis1 suggests that older adults 
retrieve less information and recalibrate their subjective judgments to this lower amount of 
details, perhaps because of age-related changes in metamemory monitoring processes (St-
Laurent, Abdi, Burianová, & Grady, 2011; Wong et al.  2012). In contrast, the recollection quality 
hypothesis proposes that older adults retrieve the same overall amount of information as 
young adults (thus leading to similar subjective ratings), but that some retrieved elements are 
distorted, different, or irrelevant, and hence less diagnostic for an objective memory evaluation 
(thus leading to inaccurate source memory). 
To test these hypotheses, McDonough et al. (2014) examined subjective memory 
reports and the neural reactivation of sensory-perceptual details during cued recollection of 
scenes using fMRI. They found that young and older participants subjectively rated their 
memories as equally detailed, but activity in sensory-perceptual brain regions was reduced in 
older adults, suggesting that they actually recollected fewer details (in line with the recollection 
quantity hypothesis). However, to our knowledge, no behavioral study has investigated the 
subjective/objective dissociation as well as the recollection quantity and quality hypotheses in 
detail.  
One limitation of previous behavioral studies is that they examined age-related 
differences separately for objective and subjective measures within the same task. Comparing 
                                                          
1 We refer to recollection quantity to designate the number of details retrieved within an event 
(i.e., the number of recalled details in a free-recall task) while recollection quality refers to the 
type or the nature of retrieved details (i.e., correct vs. incorrect details or visual details vs. 
thoughts). This differs from the study of Wong et al. (2012) in which recollection quantity 
designated the number of correctly remembered items (which corresponds to a measure of 
hits) while recollection quality referred to the number of features/details retrieved for each 
item (which corresponds to what we refer to as recollection quantity). 
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mean values of vividness and free-recall across participants allows to examine whether 
participants who, on average, emit high vividness ratings also recall more episodic details. 
However, this does not in itself provide any insight about the relationship between the 
subjective experience of remembering and the actual amount of information retrieved about a 
particular event. Addressing this issue requires to examine the relationship between objective 
and subjective recollection on a trial-by-trial basis: are variations in vividness ratings across 
trials predicted by the associated number of recalled episodic details? Mixed-effects modeling 
is particularly valuable to address this question (Baayen, Davidson, Bates, 2008). Rather than 
aggregating data into means values, mixed-effects models can describe the relationship 
between a response variable and independent variables on a trial-by-trial basis while treating 
subjects and items as random effects. Therefore, mixed-effects modeling would allow to test 
whether vividness judgments are predicted by the amount of information retrieved across trials 
and to determine whether this relationship is similar in young and older adults.  
 
The current study 
The main purpose of the current study was to investigate age-related changes in 
subjective and objective recollection, using a behavioral memory task that directly compares 
the two recollection aspects with a trial-by-trial approach. To do so, we created an episodic 
memory task inspired by McDonough et al.’s (2014) study. Pictures were associated with labels 
at encoding and these labels were then used as retrieval cues in a cued recollection task. At 
retrieval, on each trial, we combined old/new recognition memory of the labels with a 
subjective memory evaluation of recollection (vividness ratings of pictures cued by the label) 
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and two measures of objective recollection (source memory and free recall). In light of previous 
findings, we expected similar or even higher subjective recollection judgments in older than in 
younger adults (Gallo et al., 2011; Hashtroudi et al., 1990; Robin & Moscovitch, 2017; St-
Laurent, Abdi, Bondad, & Buchsbaum, 2014). The objective recollection measure was first 
operationalized with a source memory assessment about spatial (left or right position on the 
screen) and temporal (first or second encoding set) information. We hypothesized that group 
differences would be greater for temporal than spatial information. Indeed, while spatial source 
memory is not necessarily age-sensitive (Parkin et al. 1995), there is evidence that aging 
negatively impacts memory for temporal information (Kausler, Salthouse & Saults, 1988; Parkin 
et al. 1995; Bastin & Van der Linden, 2005). Mixed-effects modeling was used to evaluate the 
relationship between vividness and the accuracy of spatial and temporal source memory on a 
trial-by-trial basis. In addition to source memory, a free recall task of the content of the picture 
was used as a second objective recollection measure in order to assess whether young and 
older individuals retrieved similar amounts of details. Again, mixed-effects modeling was used 
to evaluate the relationship between vividness and the amount of details recalled on a trial-by-
trial basis. If the quantity hypothesis is true, we should observe a stronger relationship between 
vividness and free recall in young than in older adults since this hypothesis posits that older 
adults’ subjective ratings do not map onto the actual amount of information they retrieve.  
Because the quality hypothesis posits that older adults may consider distorted or 
incorrect details in the weighing of their subjective remembering experience, an evaluation of 
the accuracy of the retrieved details would also be informative. Thus, the current study aimed 
to assess age-related differences in the accuracy of the details recalled by participants. If the 
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quality hypothesis is true, we should observe a similar relationship between vividness and the 
amount of details reported at free-recall in the two age groups when incorrect details are taken 
into account (i.e., details should predict vividness to the same extent in both groups, when 
taking into account that some details retrieved by older adults may be distorted). 
In addition to episodic memory deficits, age-related differences in non-episodic 
mechanisms that are spontaneously engaged during a memory task could potentially inflate 
observed age-differences in recollection. For instance, compared to young adults, older adults 
verbally describe less information about an event even when episodic memory mechanisms are 
not necessary to perform the task, suggesting that age-related narrative changes could account 
for some of the variance observed in free-recall tasks (Gaesser, Sacchetti, Addis, & Schacter, 
2011; Madore, Gaesser, & Schacter, 2014). Moreover, age-related changes in available 
cognitive resources such as executive functioning might also impact objective recollection 
performance in such a way as to increase age-related differences (Gallo et al., 2011). Because 
both source memory and free-recall are related to executive functioning (Glisky, Polster, & 
Routhieaux, 1995; Henkel, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1998; Guler & Mackovichova, 2018) and 
given the age-related decline in executive abilities (Drag & Bieliauskas, 2010), one may wonder 
whether observed age-related differences in objective recollection measures could be amplified 
by age-differences in executive functioning. Because of the potential effects of these 
confounding variables, the participants’ descriptions during free-recall may not mirror the 
actual level of richness of their memory representations, which could in turn impact the trial-
by-trial relationship between vividness and free-recall. Thus, the current study aimed at 
controlling for these potentially confounding variables (narrative style and executive 
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functioning) to age-related differences in objective recollection and its relationship with 




Thirty-four young adults (16 men; 19–28 years; M = 23.61; SD = 1.81) and 34 older 
adults (12 men; 60–87 years; M = 70.97; SD = 6.29) participated in this study. This sample size 
was determined a priori (G-Power 3.0; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) in order to have 
a statistical power of 80% (alpha value of .05) to detect well-established age-related changes in 
recollection (effect size of Cohen’s d = .75; Koen & Yonelinas, 2014) and a significant 
relationship between source memory and executive functioning level (r = .46; Glisky et al., 
1995). Furthermore, this sample size has been shown to be sufficient to provide unbiased 
estimates of regression coefficients and their standard errors in multilevel modeling (Maas & 
Hox, 2005). All participants were native French speakers and were recruited in the Liège area of 
Belgium. None reported past or current psychiatric or neurological disorders and the groups did 
not differ in terms of education. Older participants’ general cognitive functioning was assessed 
with the Dementia Rating Scale (Mattis, 1976) and all participants performed within the norms 
(Pedraza et al., 2010). On the Mill-Hill vocabulary questionnaire (Deltour, 1993), scores 
indicated slightly better performance in older adults. Participants’ characteristics are shown in 
Table 1. All participants gave written informed consent and the study was approved by the 





Demographics and Executive Test Scores. 
 
     
  
Young (n = 34) 
 
Older (n = 34) 
 
Group difference 
  t                  p 
     
Age (years) 23.61 (1.80) 70.97 (6.29)   
Education (years) 15.88 (1.14) 15.08 (2.73) 1.56 .123 
Mill-Hill score 
(/33) 
26.55 (2.46) 28.11 (3.89) -1.97 .052 
Mattis DRS score / 138.25 (2.89)   
N-back score 26.91 (1.52) 25.61 (2.03) 2.97 .004 
Stroop score 0.57 (0.27) 1.04 (0.46) -5.18 <.001 
Plus-Minus score 23.31 (14.44) 29.33 (20.94) -1.38 .172 
Executive index 0.35 (0.51) –0.35 (0.75) 4.66 <.001 




The stimuli for the memory task were 40 colored pictures selected from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang & Bradley, 2007) and from a previous study 
(Koehler, Guo, Zhang, & Eckstein, 2014)2. Only neutral pictures (valence ranged from 4.2 to 6.2) 
were selected from the IAPS. Because we wanted the memory processes engaged in the task to 
                                                          
2 The material used in the current study can be obtained upon request.   
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be as close as possible to those engaged in real-life situations, we selected pictures that depict 
daily-life environments (e.g., pictures showing single objects such as a spoon or a mug were 
excluded), resulting in the selection of 17 pictures from the IAPS. Twenty-three additional 
pictures were selected from Koehler et al.’s (2014) set. Selected images depicted outdoor 
(garden, parking) or indoor (living room, bedroom, kitchen) environments. As in McDonough et 
al.’s (2014) study, each picture was associated with a descriptive label (one to three words). 
Forty additional lure labels for the cued recollection task were created and each of these lures 
was paired with one of the studied labels in terms of length and lexical properties. For example, 
the studied label playground was paired with a lure gymnasium. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. The stimuli were presented on a laptop computer 
and the task was programmed using the E-prime software (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA). The memory task began with an encoding session in which participants saw the 
40 pictures together with their corresponding labels for 10 seconds each (see Figure 1). Half of 
the pictures were presented on the left side of the screen and the other half on the right side 
(for subsequent spatial source memory), with a fixation cross in the center of the screen and 
the label below the cross. Each picture presentation was followed by a blank screen for 
1000 ms and the order of presentation of left and right stimuli was randomized. The encoding 
session was divided into two equal parts with a 20-second break in between (for subsequent 
temporal source memory). Spatial and temporal manipulations at encoding were 
counterbalanced across the pictures in the different versions of the task. Study instructions 
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were intentional, so participants knew that they would subsequently have to retrieve a mental 
representation of the picture from the label. However, participants were unaware of the 

























Figure 1. Schematic representation of the procedure in Experiment 1. A. At encoding, each label 
and its corresponding image were presented at the same time for 10 seconds and images were 
displayed on either the left or the right side of the screen. Each image and label presentation was 
followed by a blank screen for 1 second. The encoding phase was divided by a 20-second pause 
into two equal parts consisting of 20 images each. B. At retrieval, each trial began with a yes/no 
recognition judgment of the label. For each label judged to be old, participants answered a source 
memory question (spatial or temporal), were prompted to rate the vividness of their memory of 
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the picture and were asked to recall as many details of the picture as they could. When a label 





Following the encoding session, participants had to count backward during one minute 
(from 197 in steps of -3). Instructions regarding the cued recollection session were then 
provided and care was taken to ensure that the participants fully understood each part of the 
retrieval phase. In the cued recollection task, each trial began with the presentation of a label. 
Participants had to decide whether they had previously seen this label associated with a picture 
(nold = 40) or not (nnew = 40). When the label was judged to be new, the next trial began 
immediately. If the label was considered old, further memory questions were asked. First, 
participants had to answer either a spatial (n = 20 when the participant recognized every old 
label as such) or temporal (n = 20) source memory question regarding the picture associated 
with the label. Spatial questions corresponded to the position of the picture on the screen (left 
or right) while temporal questions asked whether the picture was presented in the first or 
second part of the encoding session. Since participants provided a source memory response for 
one modality (spatial or temporal) for each label, the attribution of a label to a source question 
was counterbalanced across participants.  
After the source memory questions, participants were asked to rate the vividness of 
their memory for the picture encoded with the associated label on a Likert scale ranging from 0 
(no memory of the picture) to 5 (extremely vivid). Then they were invited to orally recall as 
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many details of the picture as they could. Their responses were audio-recorded. When 
participants had completed their recall for one trial, they pressed any key to move on to the 




After the memory task, participants were presented with two pictures on the computer 
screen that they were asked to describe (see Gaesser et al., 2011, for a similar approach). To 
characterize participants’ spontaneous narrative style, the general instructions merely required 
participants to describe each picture without any further guidelines. The picture description 
was also audio-recorded and self-paced. 
After the memory task and picture description task, participants’ executive functioning 
was assessed using three tasks (N-back, Stroop, Plus-Minus) considered to respectively tap each 
of the main executive functions: updating, inhibition and shifting (see Table 1) (Angel et al., 
2016; Miyake et al., 2000). A detailed description of each task can be found in the 
Supplementary material. To obtain a global executive functioning measure, we averaged z-
scores of each subtest (Angel et al., 2016). Group comparisons revealed that young adults 
performed better than older adults on the N-Back task and the Stroop test, whereas there was 
no group difference on the Plus-Minus test. Overall executive functioning as indexed by the 





For each participant, the content of the free recall of each picture was transcribed. To 
evaluate participants’ recall content in depth, we used a narrative coding system that classified 
the content of each episodic detail in terms of different components (Dede et al., 2016; 
Hashtroudi et al., 1990; Lancaster & Barsalou, 1997). Eight categories were created and each 
detail of the recall of each picture was classified according to its content: person (each person 
or animal mentioned by the participant); object (objects, rooms, natural elements such as trees 
or hills); perceptual (perceptual information specifying the color, size or texture of a person or 
an object); spatial (spatial positioning of a person or an object in the picture); quantity 
(reporting any amount: 4 chairs, 3 men, and so forth); thought (a thought experienced during 
encoding and reported at recall); comment (personal statements that are not directly related to 
the recall of the content of the picture: e.g., “There was a cat. I do not like cats.” or attribution 
of what the people depicted on the picture could think, plan to do or have done: “The man was 
next to the boat propeller, he has probably finished to clean it before the picture was taken”); 
and repetition (recurrence of a detail in participant’s recall). Our eight scoring categories were 
not mutually exclusive: each detail could include components from several categories. For 
example: the detail “A white car was on the right side” includes an object component (the car), 
a perceptual component (white color) and a spatial component (right side). Furthermore, errors 
(a detail that is not depicted in the picture or that is not as the participant describes it: e.g., 
“There was a white car” when the car was blue) were scored separately and each error was 
classified according to whether it referred to a person, object, perceptual feature or spatial 
location. Each error was classified in only one category because no error involved multiple 
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component categories in the recall protocols. A similar coding procedure was applied to the 
picture descriptions but the thought and error categories were not used.  
The content of the recall of each label/image was coded by the first author. A second 
trained rater, blind to participant’s age, scored a randomly selected 20% of the data of each 
group. Across participants, Intraclass Correlation Coefficients (ICCs) between raters were 
excellent regarding the total number of components, ICC = .98; and the number of person 
components, ICC = .93; object components, ICC = .97; perceptual components, ICC = .92; spatial 
components, ICC = .92; and comments, ICC = .90. ICCs were good for thoughts, ICC = .80; and 
the number of errors, ICC = .79; and were moderate for quantities, ICC = .65; and repetitions, 
ICC = .73; (Koo & Li, 2016). Similar interrater reliability analyses were conducted for the picture 
descriptions, and the results can be found in the Supplementary material.  
 
Results 
Cued Recollection Task 
Table 2 presents mean label recognition performance, source memory scores, vividness 
ratings and free recall scores in the two age groups. Participants in both groups displayed 
comparable hits, t(66) = –0.65, p = .518, and false alarms, t(66) = –0.49, p = .622, and were able 
to discriminate between targets and lure labels as efficiently (hit minus false alarms: t(66) = –
0.57, p = .569). False alarm rates were not analyzed further because they were very low in both 
age groups. Similarly, source memory, vividness and free-recall responses associated with false 











   
Hits (%) 83.97 (11.06) 85.59 (9.42) 
False alarms (%) 0.37 (1.08) 0.51 (1.34) 
Spatial source memory 70.55 (17.17) 69.04 (13.85) 
Temporal source memory 70.66 (9.80) 62.80 (13.64) 
Vividness 2.87 (0.64) 3.30 (0.80) 
Number of correct 
components                                                                      
7.09 (2.44) 5.65 (1.62) 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Objective recollection 
With regard to source memory performance (number of correct responses divided by 
number of correctly recognized labels), there was no significant difference between young and 
older participants in spatial source memory, t(66) = 0.40, p = .692, while there was a significant 
group difference in temporal source memory, t(66) = 2.72, p = .008. To assess the possibility 
that participants’ performance on objective recollection measures was partly determined by 
executive functioning, we conducted hierarchical multiple regressions (see Supplementary 
materials). Briefly, we found that neither executive functioning nor age predicted spatial source 
memory. In contrast, executive functioning but not age predicted temporal source memory. 
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Correct responses in the free recall task were analyzed using a 2 (Group: young vs. older 
adults) x 8 (Category: person vs. object vs. perceptual vs. spatial vs. quantity vs. thought vs. 
comment vs. repetition) repeated-measures ANOVA on the number of details3. The analyses 
revealed a main effect of Group, F(1, 66) = 6.02, p = .016,  = .08, a main effect of Category, 
F(1.64, 108.35) = 387.684, p < .001,  = .85, as well as a significant Group x Category 
interaction, F(1.64, 108.35) = 9.22, p < .001,  = .12. Follow-up analyses revealed that young 
adults recalled more components in the perceptual category than older adults (Tukey test, p < 
.001), while there were no significant Group differences in the remaining categories (all ps > 
.177; see Figure 2). Both narrative style (i.e., the number of described perceptual components) 
and executive functioning predicted the amount of recalled perceptual components, but age 
still explained a significant part of the variance in the number of recalled perceptual 
components when these variables were taken into account (see Supplementary materials). So 
the age-related decline in the ability to recall perceptual components could not be simply 
attributed to lower executive functioning or to age-related changes in narrative style. 
Figure 2. 
                                                          
3 Free-recall data (both recordings and transcriptions) are in French but can be obtained upon request.   










Figure 2. Mean number of components recalled per image for each component category in young 
and older adults. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Errors in free recall were analyzed using a 2 (Group: young vs. older adults) x 4 (Error 
category: person vs. object vs. perceptual vs. spatial) repeated-measures ANOVA on error rates. 
There was a main effect of Group, F(1, 66) = 19.63, p < .001,  = .23, a main effect of Error 
category, F(1.84, 119.57) = 61.02,3 p < .001,  = .50, and a significant Group x Error category 
interaction, F(1.84, 119.57) = 5.73, p = .006,  = .08, indicating that older adults (M = 0.13) 
made more errors than young adults in the object category (M = 0.07; Tukey test, p < .001), 




















































Analyses of vividness ratings revealed that, on average, older adults rated their 
subjective memory for the picture as more vivid than young adults, t(66) = –2.44, p = .017 
(Table 1).  
 
Relationship between objective and subjective recollection 
To investigate the relationship between subjective (vividness ratings) and objective (free 
recall and source memory) recollection on a trial-by-trial basis, we used mixed-effects modeling 
using the lme4 package (Baayen, Davidson, Bates, 2008) implemented in the R software (R Core 
Team, 2017). Trials were modelled as level 1 units and participants as level 2 units. Subjects and 
items were modelled as crossed random effects. More specifically, the model included random 
intercepts for both subject and item, and by-subject random slopes (Baayen, Davidson, Bates, 
2008).  The dependent variable was vividness ratings in all analyses.  
To examine the relationship between spatial source memory and vividness, Spatial 
source memory accuracy on each trial was added as first-level predictor, Group as second-level 
predictor, and the Spatial source memory accuracy x Group cross-level interaction was also 
added to investigate potential age differences in the relationship between vividness and the 
accuracy of the spatial source memory response. This mixed-effects analysis included trials of 
the spatial source memory task as level 1 units (n= 1150) and participants as level 2 units 
(n=68).  The results revealed that the accuracy of Spatial source memory was a significant 
predictor of vividness, showing that correct Spatial source memory responses were associated 
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with higher vividness ratings (see Table 3 top). The effect of Group and the Group x Number of 
components interaction were not significant. 
A similar mixed-effects analysis was conducted with Temporal source memory accuracy 
as predictor, the other variables being the same (level 1 units = 1155; level 2 units = 68). This 
analysis revealed that the accuracy of Temporal source memory did not predict vividness (see 
Table 3 bottom). Group significantly predicted vividness ratings, indicating that higher vividness 
ratings were given by older than young adults, while the Temporal source memory x Group 
interaction was not significant. 
Table 3. Mixed-effects modeling assessing the relationship between source memory and 
vividness.  
Predictor 
                                      
Coefficients and statistics 
     β             SE             p 
 
Spatial source memory accuracy 
 
Age group                                                                         
 
Spatial source memory accuracy x 
Age group interaction 
 
     0.213        0.085         .015 
 
     0.355        0.186        .061 
 
    -0.073        0.122        .554 
 
Temporal source memory accuracy 
 
Age group                                                                         
 
Temporal source memory accuracy x 
Age group interaction 
 
     0.078        0.087         .368 
 
     0.478        0.177        .008 
 
    -0.016        0.126        .896 
Note: Vividness is the outcome variable in all analyses.  
 
Next, we examined the relationship between vividness and free-recall. To assess the 
recollection quantity hypothesis, the total number of correct components recalled (i.e., the sum 
of persons, objects, spatial, perceptual, quantity and thoughts) was added as first-level 
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predictor, Group as second-level predictor, and the Number of components x Group cross-level 
interaction was also added to investigate age differences in the relationship between vividness 
and the number of recalled components. This mixed-effects analysis included all trials as level 1 
units (n= 2305) and participants as level 2 units (n=68). The results revealed that the number of 
components recalled was a significant predictor of vividness, showing that trials that received 
higher vividness ratings were characterized by more recalled components (see Table 4 top). 
Group was also a significant predictor of vividness ratings. Finally, the Group x Number of 
components interaction was significant. Follow-up mixed-effects analyses for each group 
revealed that the number of components recalled was a significant predictor of vividness 
ratings in both groups but was stronger in young adults than in older participants. In other 
words, the relationship between the subjective and objective aspects of recollection on a trial-
by-trial basis was more pronounced in younger than in older adults. Similar results were 
obtained when measures of executive functioning and narrative style were entered in the 
model, indicating that age-related differences in the relationship between objective and 
subjective recollection cannot be simply explained by these variables.  
We also conducted a similar mixed-effects analysis with the number of recalled 
perceptual components as first-level predictor. Again, this analysis yielded a significant Group x 
Number of perceptual components interaction (see Table 4 middle), showing that the amount 
of recalled perceptual components predicted subjective vividness to a greater extent in young 





Table 4. Mixed-effects modeling assessing the relationship between free-recall and vividness.  
Predictor 
 
Coefficients and statistics 
β            SE           p 
 
 




N° correct components  
x Age group interaction 
       
      0.507        0.049       < .001 
      0.435        0.144        .003 
    –0.218        0.069        .002 
 
N° correct components  
in young adults 
 
       0.527         0.057         < .001 
 
N° correct components 
in older adults 
 
 
  0.275         0.042         < .001 
 
 




N° perceptual components  
x Age group interaction 
 
      0.149        0.033       < .001 
      0.726        0.196       < .001 
    –0.110        0.043        .013 
 
N° perceptual components  
in young adults 
 
       0.252         0.034         < .001 
 
N° perceptual components 
in older adults 
 
 
  0.155         0.029         < .001 
 
N° correct + incorrect components 
 
Age group                                                                         
 
N° correct + incorrect components x 
Age group interaction 
 
     0.474        0.047       < .001 
 
     0.420        0.143        .005 
 
    -0.187        0.071        .007 
 
N° correct + incorrect components in 
young adults 
 
      0.497         0.055         < .001 
 




      0.265         0.040         < .001 




Finally, to assess the recollection quality hypothesis, we ran a similar mixed-effects 
analysis with the total number of components recalled (correct and incorrect) as first-level 
predictor. The results were the same as those reported in the analysis with the correct 
components (see Table 4 bottom). In other words, the relationship between vividness and free-
recall was more pronounced in younger than in older adults, even when incorrect details were 
taken into account in the analysis.  
 
Discussion 
Several studies have reported that older adults subjectively rate their recollection of events as 
being as vivid and detailed as young adults do, even though they objectively recollect the 
source and specific details of these events less accurately (Hashtroudi et al. 1990; Duarte et al. 
2006; 2008; Gallo et al. 2011; Robin & Moscovitch, 2017). However, previous studies have 
yielded only indirect evidence for a dissociation between objective and subjective recollection 
measures because they compared aggregated data on the two measures in young and older 
participants. To our knowledge, this study is the first to address the relationship between 
subjective and objective recollection more directly by investigating the two aspects of 
recollection on a trial-by-trial basis. In the following paragraphs, we will first discuss results on 
objective and subjective recollection, and then we will address the extent to which our findings 






Objective recollection, as operationalized by source memory, revealed an age difference 
that was specific to temporal source memory, whereas no age-difference was found for spatial 
source memory (Bastin & Van der Linden, 2005; Henkel et al., 1998; McDonough & Gallo, 2013). 
There have been conflicting findings regarding age-related changes in spatial source memory: 
some studies showed an age-related difference (Cooper et al., 2017; Duarte et al., 2006; Parkin, 
Hunkin, & Walter, 1995), while others did not (Cooper et al., 2017). In this latter report, age-
related differences were found for source memory of items presented within scene 
backgrounds while no group difference was shown for items presented on both sides of a 
fixation cross (Cooper et al., 2017). Given that aging affects the capacity to bind items and their 
corresponding (notably spatial) features (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996), it might be more difficult 
for older individuals to retrieve the location of an item within a complex picture (Cooper et al. 
2017) than the left-right location of the picture itself as in our study. In contrast, a substantial 
body of research has shown that temporal source memory is less accurate in older than in 
young participants (Bastin & Van der Linden, 2005; Gallo et al., 2011; Parkin et al., 1995). This 
age-related deficit for temporal source memory might be due to a failure to reconstruct the 
temporal context from information associated with the item, a process that requires the 
implementation of efficient memory retrieval strategies (Bastin & Van der Linden, 2005; Bastin, 
Van der Linden, Michel, & Friedman, 2004). Consistently with previous work, age-related 
differences in temporal source memory were mediated by changes in executive functions 
(Parkin et al., 1995), which highlights that age-differences in source memory performance 
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might be, at least partly, determined by the extent to which the assessed source memory 
dimension requires the implementation of executive functioning processes. 
Free recall data revealed that older adults retrieved fewer perceptual details than young 
adults, in line with a previous study on memories for real-life events (Hashtroudi et al., 1990). 
This pattern of result is also consistent with McDonough et al.’s (2014) study, which showed 
that memory reinstatement in older adults was associated with weaker brain activity in visual 
regions responsible for the processing of perceptual information. Interestingly, the finding that 
the age-difference in free-recall remained significant after controlling for executive functioning 
and narrative style suggests that this difference relates primarily to changes in episodic memory 
mechanisms. 
Our design allowed us to specifically assess the accuracy of these recollected details and 
revealed that older adults indeed retrieved more incorrect details than young adults. One might 
suggest that these errors could be due to distortions in stored memory representations. 
Alternatively, because errors often consisted in recalling a non-present object that was 
plausible for the scene (e.g., a bed in a picture showing only chests of drawers and toys in a 
child’s bedroom), this could reflect a biased reconstruction of the scene from general 
knowledge elicited by the label. Indeed, the use of the label to cue the retrieval of a complex 
picture may activate conceptual and schematic knowledge related to the scene (Wing, Ritchey, 
& Cabeza, 2015), which could bias remembering experience. This schematic knowledge account 
may explain why older adults made more object errors than young participants since aging has 
been associated with an overreliance on pre-existing schematic knowledge while remembering 




Age-related differences in subjective recollection and its relationship with objective 
recollection 
The main aim of this study was to investigate whether age-related memory changes in 
objective recollection would be accompanied by similar variations in the subjective 
remembering experience. Consistent with previous findings (Comblain et al., 2005; Johnson et 
al., 2015; Robin & Moscovitch, 2017), aging was not associated with reduced subjective 
recollection. Thus, taken separately, measures of source memory, free recall and vividness 
showed a dissociation between objective and subjective recollection in aging. The novel aspect 
of our study is the use of mixed-effects modeling to shed light on the relationship between 
these two aspects of recollection on a trial-by-trial basis. 
Mixed-effects modeling first revealed that spatial, but not temporal, source memory 
accuracy predicted subjective vividness ratings. This result suggests that being able to reinstate 
the spatial context of a scene may contribute to the subjective quality of memories. In contrast, 
our results suggest that temporal source memory is not used for judging memory vividness, 
perhaps because subjective vividness judgements in the current study were mainly based on 
visual features. Interestingly, spatial source memory accuracy predicted vividness to a similar 
extent in both age-groups, suggesting that the extent to which the reinstatement of spatial 
context contributes to subjective vividness does not change with aging. 
The hypotheses proposed by McDonough et al., (2014) were tested by examining the 
trial-by-trial relationship between vividness judgments and the details produced during the 
free-recall task. As a reminder, the recollection quantity hypothesis posits that older adults 
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retrieve less information than young adults and recalibrate their subjective ratings, whereas the 
recollection quality hypothesis proposes that older adults can calibrate their subjective memory 
ratings as precisely as young adults do, but that the retrieved details they rely on are distorted, 
different or less diagnostic.  
Our findings are more in line with the recollection quantity hypothesis. Older adults 
provided higher vividness ratings than young adults, which suggests that, overall, they 
overestimated their subjective memory experience with regard to the amount of retrieved 
episodic details (recollection quantity hypothesis). This latter hypothesis was supported by the 
finding that the amount of retrieved (especially perceptual) details better predicted vividness 
ratings in young than older adults, a difference that could not be simply attributed to age-
differences in narrative style or free-recall. These results echo with previous work showing that 
the relationship between subjective confidence and memory accuracy was stronger in young 
than older adults (Wong et al. 2012). The authors attributed older adults’ poorer confidence 
calibration to the reduced amount of retrieved details and/or age-related impairments in 
memory monitoring processes: a reduction in the amount of episodic details could make the 
discrimination between targets and lures challenging because fewer diagnostic features would 
be available (Wong et al. 2012). Support for this hypothesis comes from a study showing that 
when memory performance was equated between age-groups, older adults did not differ in the 
resolution of their Feeling-of-Knowing judgements relative to young adults. So it seems that 
older adults can calibrate their subjective ratings when the corresponding memory traces are 
sufficiently strong (Hertzog, Dunlosky & Sinclair, 2010). Therefore, the older adults’ poorer 
vividness calibration observed in the current study could result from a lower number of 
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retrieved (perceptual) episodic details. Remembering few episodic details might make it 
difficult to differentiate between a poor and a rich subjective experience of remembering, 
which would reduce objective-subjective memory calibration.  
Alternatively, older adults’ poorer vividness calibration could be explained by age-
related metamemory changes. With increasing age, people might have difficulties determining 
what constitutes a highly vivid episodic memory experience and might therefore erroneously 
consider an impoverished memory representation to be rich and detailed. In a related vein, it 
has been proposed that older adults lower their vividness criterion, such that they content 
themselves with a reduced amount of details and, consequently, overestimate the subjective 
richness of their memory representations (St-Laurent et al., 2011).  
On the other hand, the recollection quality hypothesis posits that young and older 
adults rely on different types of information to make vividness judgements, with older adults 
using more erroneous or distorted information (McDonough et al., 2014). However, we found 
that when incorrect details were taken into account, the relationship between free-recall and 
vividness was still stronger in young than in older adults. In other words, older adults were still 
less calibrated than young adults in their subjective memory ratings when erroneous details 
were included in the free-recall measure. This suggests that older adults’ poorer calibration of 
subjective vividness cannot be attributed to the inclusion of distorted/incorrect details in their 
judgements.  
Although the current study does not provide support for the recollection quality 
hypothesis, we cannot rule out the possibility that older adults relied on episodic details that 
were not captured by the current paradigm. For instance, Koutstaal (2003) suggested that older 
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adults do not give as much importance or weight to the retrieval of perceptual features (color, 
size, texture) of objects as young adults do. Rather, they tend to rely preferentially on gist-
based information when making memory judgments (Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997). Therefore, 
older adults could base their vividness ratings on gist information retrieved from the descriptive 
label rather than on specific details from the picture, which might partly explain why the 
amount of episodic details predicted their subjective memory experience to a lesser extent. 
Alternatively, older adults could relate picture stimuli to personal memories or autobiographical 
knowledge to a greater extent than young adults during encoding and they could subsequently 
rely on these internal sources to judge the subjective quality of their memories (Mitchell & 
Johnson, 2009). Young and older adults may thus spontaneously weight different kinds of 
information (that they initially experience to a different degree during memory encoding) when 
remembering, which might impact how they judge the subjective quality of their memories 
(Johnson et al., 2015).  
Mitchell and Hill (2019) recently examined whether age-related changes in source 
memory performance and subjective memory judgements could be attributed to the fact that 
young and older adults focus on different types of information during episodic encoding. While 
seeing pictures, young and older adults were asked to focus on three types of features for 
which they judged the subjective vividness (i.e., the visual details, emotion, and personal 
memories/thoughts evoked by the pictures). They were further instructed to mentally visualize 
half of the pictures and to make one subjective judgement (visual details or emotion or 
personal thought) per picture. Subsequently, a source memory test asked whether each picture 
was encoded and then mentally visualized or was only encoded. Results revealed that the 
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subjective ratings made when seeing and mentally visualizing the pictures did not differ 
between age-groups, while source memory performance was reduced in older adults (Mitchell 
& Hill, 2019). Interestingly, however, the intensity of the subjective judgements made when 
mentally visualizing the pictures correlated with the accuracy of subsequent source memory in 
both age-groups. These results suggest that when young and older adults presumably focus on 
the same features during encoding, these features are judged at a similar level of vividness and 
become equally diagnostic for source memory decisions in both age-groups, although older 
adults perform less well than young adults (which may be attributed to age-related changes in 
memory monitoring processes; Mitchell & Hill, 2019). This highlights that older adults can 
process and use the same details as young adults for their memory decisions, at least when 
they are encouraged to focus on these details. Asking young and older participants to focus on 
the same types of features during memory encoding is thus a promising approach for future 
studies to shed further light on the types of features that give rise to a subjective sense of 
remembering in young and older individuals. 
One last factor that might in part account for the present results relates to older 
participants’ memory self-efficacy, that is, one’s beliefs about the weaknesses and strengths of 
one’s memory capacities (Hultsch et al., 1988). Specifically, it could be that older adults realized 
that they did not remember some pictures (i.e., missed trials) and to compensate for this, they 
might assign high vividness judgements to remembered images so as to make them feel better 
regarding their memory self-efficacy (e.g.,”I know that I forgot some images but the ones I 
remember, I recollect them very well”).  
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Finally, a limitation of the current study is that although we took care to select neutral 
pictures, some of the pictures that were used were not pre-tested for emotion and arousal 
ratings. Given the emotional bias occurring during remembering in older individuals (Kensinger, 
2009), our findings should be replicated with pictures that would be validated for both young 
and older adults. Besides, a validation of the labels used to cue recollection (i.e., to ensure that 
they match with their corresponding pictures both for young and older participants) would also 




In conclusion, this study replicates previous findings that older adults show an 
impoverished capacity to retrieve specific contextual information and details from complex 
scenes. The age-related decline in retrieving specific –perceptual – details from a scene 
persisted even after controlling for the effects of executive functioning and narrative style, 
suggesting that the decline might be underpinned by episodic memory changes. In contrast, 
older participants rated their memories as more vivid than young adults. We found that the 
capacity to recollect the spatial context from scenes significantly predicted the associated 
subjective vividness judgements in both age-groups. Although a significant relationship 
between the subjective experience of remembering and the objective amount of perceptual 
episodic information retrieved was also observed in both groups, this relationship was stronger 
in young than in older adults. In other words, older adults do not only retrieve fewer specific 
episodic details but also rely on these details to a lesser extent to calibrate their subjective 
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memory ratings. Future work should attempt to understand how the weighting of episodic 
details gives rise to the subjective experience of recollection across the lifespan. This would 
provide important insights into how the human cognitive system generates subjective 
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Deciphering the Relationship between Objective and Subjective Aspects of Recollection in 
Healthy Aging 






























Picture Description Task  
The content of the description of each image was coded by the first author. A second 
trained rater, blind to participant’s age, scored a randomly selected 20% of the data of each 
group. Across participants, Intraclass Correlation Coefficients (ICCs) between raters revealed 
excellent interrater agreement regarding the total number of components, ICC = .99; object 
components, ICC = .99; perceptual components, ICC = .98; spatial components, ICC = .93; 
quantities, ICC = .93; and comments, ICC = .90. Good agreement was found for repetitions, ICC = 
.77; and moderate agreement for the number of person components, ICC = .52. 
We conducted a 2 (Group: young vs. older adults) x 6 (Category: object vs. perceptual vs. 
spatial vs. quantity vs. comment vs. repetition) repeated-measures ANOVA on the picture 
description task5. There was a main effect of Category, F(1.75, 115.69) = 148.146, p < .001,  = 
.69 (Figure S1), but no main effect of Group, F(1, 66) < 1, p = .61,  = .01, and no Group x 






                                                          
5 Because the ICC was low regarding the person components category, we decided not to include it in the 
subsequent analysis. Note that when it was included, the pattern of result did not change. 











Figure S1. Mean number of components described per image for each component 




Participants’ executive functioning was assessed using the N-back, Stroop and Plus-Minus 
tasks that respectively measure updating, inhibition and shifting functions. 
N-back task (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Perrig, & Meier, 2010). The experimenter orally 
presented a series of 30 letters. For each letter, the participant had to decide whether it was the 













































Stroop test (Stroop, 1935). The color and interference subtests were used to measure 
participants’ inhibitory abilities. An interference score was calculated as follows: ([number of 
correct responses for 45 seconds in color subtest] – [number of correct responses for 45 seconds 
in interference subtest]) / (number of correct responses for 45 seconds in color subtest). 
Plus-Minus task (Hull, Martin, Beier, Lane, & Hamilton, 2008). This test comprised three 
written subtests (addition, subtraction, alternation). In the first subtest, participants had to add 
3 to each number. In the second, they had to subtract 3 from each number. In the last, they had 
to alternate between additions and subtractions of 3. For each participant, an alternating score 
could be computed as follows: (time in alternation) – (time in addition + time in subtraction)/2.  
 
Relationship between non-episodic mechanisms and objective recollection 
To assess the possibility that participants’ performance on objective recollection 
measures was partly determined by their executive functioning, we conducted hierarchical 
multiple regressions (see Table S1). Our variable of interest – executive functioning – was 
entered in first step while age was entered in second step. We found that executive functioning 
did not significantly predict spatial source memory performance. When age was then loaded, it 
did not significantly predict spatial source memory performance. We also found that executive 
functioning was a significant predictor of temporal source memory performance, whereas age 
did not improve the model.  
 
Next, to evaluate the extent to which participants’ executive functioning and narrative 
style predicted the number of perceptual components recalled, we conducted a multiple 
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regression with the number of perceptual components recalled as dependent variable and 
where executive functioning, narrative style and age were entered respectively in first, second 
and third step (see Table S1). This analysis revealed that narrative style significantly predicted 
the number of components recalled even after controlling for the effect of executive 
functioning. When age was added in the third step, it significantly predicted recall performance 




Hierarchical regression analyses. Left column represents the dependent variable of each 
regression. The remaining columns from the left to the right represent each variable entered 
step by step in the regression. 
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